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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the effect of forced financial restatements on the share prices listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). An event study methodology is used to examine the share 
price reaction of 34 firms that forcefully restated their results following a GAAP Monitoring 
Panel review. The results indicate that the equity of 79.1 per cent of the firms decreased as a 
result of the restatement. The average standardised abnormal returns for 55.9 per cent of these 
firms were also found to be negative. The study further finds that the volume of shares traded 
directly following the announcement increased substantially, especially five days following the 
announcement. The study makes a contribution to the existing literature in that is the first of its 
kind to focus on the share price reaction of forced financial restatements on share prices in the 
South African context.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he recent turmoil of the global financial crisis has adversely affected financial markets to an extent 
unprecedented in recent decades. Regulators have had to reassess their role in not only domestic 
markets, but international markets too and specifically how interrelated markets within the global 
context have become. Needless to say, Stock exchanges throughout the world have in many cases bore the brunt of 
this as investors search for safe havens to safeguard their capital. On a macro level, the soundness and credibility of 
these exchanges are therefore important gauges for increased capital injection to not only the firm involved, but to 
the growth potential of an economy as a whole. On a micro level, the financial performance of firms listed on these 
exchanges is heavily dependent on the disclosure of accurate and credible information disseminated through, 
amongst others, annual reports. With this in mind, this paper investigates the effect of financial restatements on the 
share returns of firm listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Accurate disclosure of information is crucial to ensuring the integrity of a sound corporate and financial 
environment. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 pays testament to this. Embedded in the crisis was the lack of US 
banks’ mitigation of the inherent risk pertaining to the so-called ‘sub-prime’ loans. Assumptions were made about 
the projected growth path of the economy and this was built into the risk faced by the banks being understated. 
Instead of the risk being mitigated, it was transferred to fellow market participants and became a global crisis that 
some have estimated to be second only to the Great Depression of 1929 (Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan & Laeven 
2010). Notwithstanding the concerns surrounding corporate governance and the necessary regulatory oversight, an 
important lesson to learn from the financial crisis is that the disclosure of information to the market is crucially 
important as market participants are able to react in ways that are potentially devastating to market stability (Bardos, 
Golec & Harding 2011:1918).  
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Further to this, the unexpected events of the highly publicised corporate failures
1
 resulted in capital markets 
around the world experiencing a loss of investor confidence (Rezaee 2004:107). For many of these firms, financial 
restatements had a devastating effect with equity values plummeting and credit ratings often being reduced to junk 
status (Agrawal & Chadha 2005). The flow of information, and more importantly accurate information, is therefore 
crucial to stabilising possible concerns and perceptions that market participants may have. Within this context, the 
primary objective of this study is to examine the short-term share price reaction to forced financial restatements 
resulting from the work of the GAAP Monitoring Panel (GMP). A two stage event study methodology is used to 
examine these objectives. To the knowledge of the authors, no study has focused on the market reaction of share 
price movements based on forced financial restatement announcements in the South African context.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 
Since its modest beginnings, the JSE has evolved to one of the top twenty largest equity exchanges in the 
world with a market capitalisation of R6,119 trillion at the end of 2010 (World Federation of Exchanges 2010). The 
JSE performs well in global terms. For example, in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) annual ‘Global 
Competitiveness Report’ of 2011/12, the JSE was ranked first globally in 2010 and 2011 for regulation and 
supervision (World Economic Forum 2011:486). In addition, the WEF ranked the JSE fourth with regards to the 
ease to raise money by issuing shares (World Economic Forum 2011:482). Given further that the interests of 
minority shareholders being protected by the legal system ranked third and that the auditing and reporting standards 
vis-à-vis firm financial performance ranked first in 2011 (World Economic Forum 2011:407,409), these results 
suggest that the operating and regulatory environment that listed firms operate within in South Africa is comparable 
with the best in the world.  
 
For a period of approximately 60 years since its inception in 1886, the JSE was self-regulated with the first 
legislation the Stock Exchanges Control Act (SECA) enacted in 1947. Supporting the notion of self-regulation, the 
SECA mandated the JSE to be self regulating and required that the JSE prepare and maintain its own listing 
requirements (JSE Limited 2010b). In addition to SECA, the JSE is also regulated by the Financial Markets Control 
Act of 1989, the Custody and Administration of Securities Act of 1992, and the Insider Trading Act of 1998. The 
closing of the open outcry trading floor and the introduction of the centralised, automated trading system known as 
the Johannesburg Equities Trading (JET) system on 7 June 1996 contributed towards the value of shares traded 
during 1996 reaching a new record of R117,4 billion and new capital to the amount of R28,4 billion being raised 
(JSE Limited 2010b). The JSE in collaboration with South Africa’s four largest commercial banks established the 
electronic settlement system, STRATE, and the process to dematerialise and electronically settle securities listed on 
the JSE on a rolling, contractual and guaranteed basis was initiated during 1996. On 13 May 2002 the JET system 
gave way to the JSE Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS), a trading system implemented in conjunction with the 
London Stock Exchange (JSE Limited 2010b).  
 
These technological advances contributed to the JSE being ranked amongst the top twenty largest global 
securities exchanges in terms of market capitalisation (JSE Limited 2010a). With the exception of 2002 and 2008, 
the JSE market capitalisation has increased annually and at the end of 2010 the exchange reached a record level of 
R6,119 trillion (see Table I), which at that time equalled approximately 925 billion US$. This is still relatively small 
in comparison to the market capitalisation of the largest exchange in the world, the New York Stock Exchange, of 
approximately 13 trillion US$ (World Federation of Exchanges 2010). Nevertheless, the JSE is well regulated and 
competes favourably with leading global exchanges, if not in size, but in regulatory oversight and investor 
protection. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For example, Adelphia (US), Bristol-Myers Squibb (US), Cendant (USA), ComROAD AG (Germany), Enron (US), Global 
Crossing (Bermuda), HealthSouth (US), LeisureNet (South Africa), Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products (Belgium), Parmalat 
(Italy), Qwest Communications (US), Royal Ahold (Netherlands), Sunbeam (US), Tyco (Bermuda), Waste Management (US) 
and WorldCom (US). 
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Table I 
Summary Of Market Capitalisation And Trading 
Year 
Domestic market 
capitalization 
Number of 
listed firms 
Total value of 
shares trading 
Number of trades 
in equity shares 
Number of 
shares traded 
 
(R millions) 
 
(R millions) (in thousands) (in millions) 
2010 6,119,662.3 397 2,478,847.8 23,662.3 59,473.4 
2009 5,883,851.1 396 2,214,508.5 20,845.5 68,182.9 
2008 4,514,451.6 411 3,263,065.2 17,399.0 82,580.6 
2007 5,660,149.8 411 2,977,669.6 11,553.8 70,787.1 
2006 5,014,756.8 389 2,121,499.6 7,953.5 74,487.3 
2005 3,484,000.6 373 1,278,689.6 5,064.0 54,509.7 
2004 2,493,100.0 389 1,031,207.0 3,911.5 45,438.4 
2003 1,123,156.3 411 752,249.6 3,253.9 43,052.5 
2002 986,774.3 451 808,752.3 3,729.9 55,790.4 
2001 1,011,700.0 532 606,137.1 4,136.7 59,557.0 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 2010 
 
3.2. International Financial Reporting Standards and JSE listing requirements addressing financial 
restatements 
 
Prior to the enactment of the new Companies Act (71 of 2008), South African legislation provided no legal 
backing for accounting standards and the listed firms were required to comply with International Financial 
Reporting Standards’ (IFRS) in terms of the JSE listing requirements. Issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) during September 2010, the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting requires that 
financial statements faithfully represent the economic circumstances. In terms of paragraph QC12 of the Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting a perfectly faithful representation is considered to be, “…complete, neutral and 
free from error.” (International Accounting Standards Board 2010a:84). The International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) specifically addressing prior period errors, namely Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and 
Errors (or IAS 8), highlights the fact that errors may arise in respect of the recognition, measurement, presentation 
or disclosure of elements of financial statements. IAS 8 further states that, “[f]inancial statements do not comply 
with IFRSs if they contain either material errors or immaterial errors made intentionally to achieve a particular 
presentation of an entity’s financial position, financial performance or cash flows” (International Accounting 
Standards Board 2010b:A422). 
 
In terms of IAS 8, potential errors discovered in the current period are corrected before the financial 
statements are authorised. It may however happen that errors are sometimes not discovered until a subsequent 
period. Where prior period errors are as such identified, IAS 8 requires that, “...an entity shall correct material prior 
period errors retrospectively in the first set of financial statements authorised for issue after their discovery by: (a) 
restating the comparative amounts for the prior period(s) presented in which the error occurred; or (b) if the error 
occurred before the earliest prior period presented, restating the opening balances of assets, liabilities and equity for 
the earliest prior period presented” (International Accounting Standards Board 2010b:A422). In addition, various 
provisions of the JSE listing requirements require firms to correct any incomplete or misleading information. In 
terms of paragraph 8.65 of the listing requirements (JSE Limited 2010c:8-25), “the JSE will be able, in its sole 
discretion to censure such issuer in accordance with the provisions contained in the listings requirements and 
instruct such issuer to publish or re-issue any information the JSE deems appropriate.” 
 
A listed firm accordingly has an obligation from both an accounting standard and JSE listing requirement 
perspective to correct prior period errors and provide the necessary disclosure about such restatements. Considering 
that the correction of prior period errors are likely to affect restating firms’ share prices, the reporting entity is 
accordingly obliged to communicate this information to shareholders and other interested parties through making a 
security exchange news service (SENS) announcement. The extent of the expected market reaction on share prices 
forms the focus of this study. 
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3.3. Financial restatement literature 
 
International evidence reveals that the number and size of firms issuing restated results are increasing each 
year. The number of restatements in the US for example increased from 92 in 1997 to 225 in 2001 (United States 
General Accounting Office 2002). The average market capitalisation of restating firms, increased from $500 million 
in 1997 to $2 billion in 2002 (United States General Accounting Office 2002). In a follow up study, the United 
States General Accounting Office in 2006, found that the number of restatements for the period 2002 through 
September 2005 had increased by 67 per cent and the market capitalisation of restating firms had decreased by $36 
billion when adjusting for market movements on the days around the initial restatement announcement (United 
States General Accounting Office 2007). While these restatement data relate to firms listed on the securities 
exchanges in the US, a similar trend is found in South Africa with an ever increasing number of firms having to 
restate results due to accounting irregularities and fraud (Saville 2006). This trend is troubling as a financial 
restatement effectively equates to an admission that previously authorised and audited financial reports contain 
misrepresentations (Almer, Gramling & Kaplan 2008). While financial restatements substantially erode investors’ 
belief in the trustworthiness and credibility of management (Mercer 2004), they further pose a threat to the entity in 
that investors’ perceptions about the firms past and future performance may be altered (Palmrose & Scholz 2004). 
Further research examining the average share price reactions to financial restatements found that share prices of 
restating firms are, on average, negatively affected. The percentage by which share prices change vary between 
negative six per cent (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1996) and negative nine per cent (Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz 
2004). Xu, Jin and Li (2009) ascribe the negative market reaction to an increased risk premium resulting from an 
increase in information uncertainty and impairment of information quality for restating firms.  
 
Furthermore, prior studies examining financial restatements have researched various aspects including, but 
not limited to the examination of determinants of the market reaction to restatement announcements (Palmrose et al. 
2004), the contagion effects of accounting restatements (Gleason, Jenkins & Johnson 2008), the role of board 
independence in voluntary versus forced restatements (Marciukaityte, Szewczyk & Varma 2009), the long-term 
reactions to earnings restatements (Xu et al. 2009), the role that industry expertise plays in reducing restatements 
(Chin & Chi 2009), the reputational penalties to managers of firms announcing earnings restatements (Desai, Hogan 
& Wilkins 2006), the avoidance of reputational damage in financial restatements (Gertsen, van Riel & Berens 2006), 
and the relationship between restatements and litigation (Palmrose & Scholz 2004). Therefore, although it is 
acknowledged that various factors may influence the market’s reaction to financial restatements, a market reaction is 
generally expected in response to financial restatement announcements. Within the South African context, financial 
restatements are expected to result from either the firm and/or its auditors identifying errors and restating results or, 
alternatively, as a result of an investigation or technical recommendation by the GMP to the JSE listings division.  
 
3.4. The GAAP Monitoring Panel 
 
In an attempt to enhance JSE listed firm compliance with accounting standards, a joint initiative between 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) and the JSE resulted in the establishment of an 
oversight board known as the GMP during September of 2002 (Accountancy SA 2008). In terms of the GMP charter 
and JSE listing requirements, the GMP acts in an advisory capacity to the JSE Issuer Services Division in relation to 
incidents of alleged non-compliance of financial reporting (SAICA 2011b). Following an investigation by the GMP, 
the Issuer Services Division considers the recommendations and findings of the GMP to decide upon the appropriate 
action where deemed necessary (SAICA 2011b). Although only investigating matters referred to it by the JSE Issuer 
Services Division, the GMP has investigated a total of 38 incidents of alleged non-compliance for the period 
September 2002 until June 2010 (SAICA 2010). In addition to the action taken by the JSE Issuer Services Division 
following investigations by the GMP, the Issuer Services Division have on occasion advised all listed firms on non-
compliance issues such as amongst others, the non-consolidation of share trust schemes by listed firms.  
 
While this study focuses on financial restatements resulting from the investigations or technical 
recommendation by the GMP, it is noted that the GMP has subsequently been replaced by the Financial Reporting 
Investigation Panel (FRIP) on 16 February 2011 (SAICA 2011a). In an attempt to further improve compliance with 
IFRS, firms are now subjected to a proactive review and monitoring process whereby the financial statements of 
listed firms will in the future be reviewed at least once every five years (SAICA 2011c). 
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3.5. The Securities Exchange News Service 
 
As share prices incorporate both private and public information (Qi, Goldstein & Wei 2007), the need to 
keep the market informed with public information cannot be overemphasised enough. In order to facilitate the real 
time, equal and wide dissemination of relevant firm information to security holders and any other interested parties, 
the JSE established the Securities Exchange News Service (SENS) (previously known as Stock Exchange News 
Service) in August 1997 (JSE Limited 2010b). Following the establishment of SENS, the JSE listing requirements 
were amended to facilitate the release of information, including price sensitive information via SENS (JSE Limited 
2010b). 
 
Accordingly, price sensitive information is defined in the JSE listings requirements (JSE Limited 2010c:11) 
as “unpublished information that, if it were made public, would be reasonably likely to have an effect on the price of 
a listed firm’s securities.” In order to promote the equal distribution of information and to ensure confidentiality 
prior to announcement, price sensitive information may not be released to a third party within JSE trading hours 
until published through SENS. Alternatively, price sensitive information cannot be released outside JSE trading 
hours until such information has been authenticated and arrangements have been made for announcement through 
SENS prior to the next opening of JSE trading hours (JSE Limited 2010c:3-5). Emphasising the importance of 
confidentiality with regards to price sensitive information, Section 3.7 of the JSE listing requirements (JSE Limited 
2010c:3-6) state that “[p]rice sensitive information required by and provided in confidence to any government 
department, the South African Reserve Bank, the SRP, the Financial Services Board or any other statutory or 
regulatory body or authority need not be published, unless there is a breach of confidentiality and the market is made 
aware of such information, in which event the issuer must immediately announce details of such information.” 
Should it happen that confidential information be disclosed in an unplanned manner, Section 3.8 of the listing 
requirements requires that immediate steps be taken for a SENS announcement containing such price sensitive 
information to be made (JSE Limited 2010c:3-6). 
 
Given that, as discussed above, the listing requirements firstly facilitate the release of price sensitive 
information through SENS and further emphasise the importance of confidentiality prior to the SENS 
announcement, this study uses SENS announcements to firstly identify financial restatements resulting from 
investigations or technical recommendations by the GMP and secondly as the event date. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1. Event study methodology  
 
Event study methodology is frequently used to firstly test whether or not the market efficiently incorporates 
new information into the share price and secondly, under the maintained hypothesis of market efficiency, examine 
the impact of some event on the wealth of the firm’s security holders (Binder 1998). While various models have 
been used in event studies, the market model (which is a standard simple linear regression where the returns for each 
share are regressed against the returns on a broad index) is widely used to examine the impact of an event on share 
prices and/or market efficiency (Corhay & Tourani-Rad 1996).  
 
This study, similar to Bremer and Zhang (2007), uses a two-stage event test methodology incorporating the 
market model to specifically examine the effect of financial restatement announcements on restating firm’s share 
price movement. This test scales abnormal returns (refer to formula 2 below) with conditional variance and is 
estimated with a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic [GARCH (1,1)] component and an event 
indicator. The GARCH (1,1) component is a general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model that accounts 
for time varying volatility by regressing the last period’s squared return [i.e. just one return] and the last period’s 
variance (i.e. just one variance) (Harper 2010). This test increases the ability to correctly identify abnormal returns 
during event periods and is particularly useful for investigating events that have higher levels of event-induced 
volatility, smaller sample sizes and effect sizes (Bremer & Zhang 2007). This event study methodology is a 
variation of the event study methodology first introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) that resulted in a 
methodological revolution in the fields of accounting, economics and finance research (Binder 1998).  
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Fama et al. (1969) used return data to estimate the parameters of the market model for each share in the 
sample. Doing so eliminates movements in share prices attributable to market-wide economic or common factors, 
leaving the portion of the return attributable to firm specific information (which in this case is the announcement of 
a financial restatement) (Binder 1998). The regression model is estimated for each firm separately and the residuals 
from the market model for the event month are used as an estimator of the abnormal return for the share during the 
event month. These residuals are then averaged across firms in the sample and tested for significance using a t-test, 
which assesses whether or not the means of two groups are statistically different from each other (Trochim 2006). 
Where the financial restatement announcement has no effect, the abnormal return is expected to be zero. Any 
movement away from zero is accordingly attributed to the restatement announcement. 
 
Further to this, the first stage of the methodology is thus to eliminate market wide or common factors 
affecting share prices in order to determine the abnormal returns. Distinguishing between the estimation and event 
periods (refer to diagram I), this study excludes the daily return data during the event period in estimating the 
parameters of the market model for each share in the sample. Including the event period data to estimate the market 
model parameters may bias the coefficient estimates as the effects of the event are then included in the estimates 
(Ball & Brown 1968). This study therefore excludes the event period data to estimate the market model parameters. 
Such an exclusion has become a standard modification to address this issue (Binder 1998).  
 
Diagram I 
The Estimation and Event Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram I indicates that of the 179 days leading up to the SENS announcement date (Day 0), 159 days are 
included in the estimation period and the 20 days just prior to the SENS announcement date (Day 0) are included in 
the event period. The event period further includes Day 0 and the 20 days subsequent to Day 0. The estimation 
period thus includes 159 days and the event period 41 days. In addition to distinguishing between the estimation and 
event period data to estimate the market model parameters, a GARCH structure of order (1,1) is added to the market 
model in this study. The GARCH (1,1) structure accounts for time varying volatility change in the estimation period. 
 
The modified market model formula is thus: 
 
                     (1) 
            
   
               
          
   
 
where        is the return for share i on day t 
       is the return for the all share index on day t 
       is the residual or non-market return for share i on day t  
  ,  ,    ,    ,    are parameters to be estimated  
    
    is the conditional variance 
 
After estimation of the parameters using the modified market model, the second stage entails the 
calculation of the abnormal returns. The abnormal returns      for each day in the event period (day -20 till day 
+20) are calculated as the difference between the expected share return      ) and the actual share return (     for 
  Day-20  Day+20 Day -179 
Estimation period 
159 days 
Event period 
41 days 
Day 0  
SENS Announcement Date 
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each share. The expected share return        during the event period is calculated using the modified market model 
above.  
 
Therefore, the formula for the abnormal returns (AR) is: 
 
              [t = day -20, day 0 and day +20] (2) 
 
where       is the expected return on share i in period t 
      is the actual return on the share i in period t 
     is the abnormal return 
 
Considering that the share return is affected by both the SENS announcement and other firm-specific 
effects, the abnormal return estimator is likely to result in a larger variance during the event period than in non-event 
periods and hence event-induced heteroskedasticity is likely (Beaver 1968). To account for heteroskedasticity, 
Collins and Dent (1984) propose using a least-squares technique while Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen (1991) 
propose standardising the abnormal return estimates by their estimated standard deviation. Corhay and Tourani-Rad 
(1996) used the GARCH model for the variance of the error term in the return equation.  
 
Considering that event-induced heteroskedasticity is likely and that variations amongst different firms’ 
abnormal returns is possible, this study standardises the abnormal return by an estimate of the conditional variance 
where the conditional variance is estimated using another GARCH model, but this time which includes the event 
period. A dummy variable taking a value of one (1) during the event period and a value of zero (0) otherwise is also 
added to the GARCH structure. This allows for estimation of slow and abrupt changes in the conditional variance 
during the event period. Scaling the abnormal returns with the conditional variance estimated in this way controls 
for event induced heteroskedasticity as well as for variance between different firms’ abnormal returns (Bremer & 
Zhang 2007). 
 
Thus, the formula for the standardised abnormal return (SAR) is: 
 
       
    
   
  
 (3) 
 
 
where         is the standardised abnormal return 
       is the abnormal return on the share i in period t 
    
   is the conditional variance estimated using a second GARCH model 
 
The standardised abnormal returns are then averaged per day to produce the average standardised abnormal 
returns (ASAR) and tested for significance using the standard t-test. In order to examine the effect that forced 
financial restatement announcements have on restating firm share prices, the standardised abnormal returns are 
accumulated for each day, averaged across firms, and then tested for significance using the standard t-test. In 
addition to being averaged per day, the standardised abnormal returns are accumulated for each day, day -20 until 
day -19, day -20 until day -18, day -20 until day -17 and so on. These cumulative standardised abnormal returns are 
then averaged across companies to create the average cumulative standardised abnormal return (ACSAR). The 
ASARs and ACSARs were then tested for significance using the standard t-test. 
 
4.2. Sample of the study 
 
The McGregor BFA database “is the pre-eminent provider of stock market, fundamental research data and 
news to the financial sector and the corporate market at large” (McGregor BFA, 2010).  In order to identify the 
sample of financial restating firms, the McGregor BFA database is used to search for SENS announcements 
containing variations of the phrases “GAAP Monitoring Panel”, “GMP”, “restate” and “restatement” for the period 
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1 September 2002 until 30 October 2010.  In addition to using the McGregor BFA database to identify financial 
restating firms, it was also used to obtain the All-Share-Index and firm specific share prices. 
 
Table II presents the chronological distribution of the 38 SENS announcements of financial restatement 
resulting from investigations or recommendations by the GMP for the period 1 September 2002 until 30 October 
2010. With the exception of 2004, the annual number of financial restatements resulting from work of the GMP 
included in the sample did not exceed four. Fifteen of the 21 GMP financial restatements during 2004 resulted from 
a technical recommendation by the GMP to the JSE Listings Division that share incentive scheme trusts be 
consolidated into the group financial statements in accordance with IFRS’s. Firms subsequently issuing a SENS 
announcement to this effect were also included in the sample. There were no GMP financial restatement SENS 
announcements during 2009. Table II also provides the number of potential and actual days that shares for the 
respective firms were traded.  
 
The inclusion of daily returns for thinly traded shares to predict share price reactions to an event may 
impact on the results found. By examining both the daily trading volume data for exchange traded and Nasdaq 
stocks, Cowan & Sergeant (1996) conclude that as thinly traded stocks are more likely to be characterised by 
numerous zero and large non-zero returns, they are more likely to result in non-normal return distributions. This in 
turn distorts the variance estimates required for the standardised abnormal return test. While Boehmer et al. (1991) 
developed a standardised cross-sectional test to address this issue, Corrado (1989) uses a nonparametric rank test 
and thus avoids the dependence on normality of return distributions. Cowan & Sergeant (1996), however, find that 
during the estimation period, the average number of days without shares being traded was approximately 20 days 
(19.97 days) out of the potential 159 days, representing only 12.6 per cent of the estimation period. Within the event 
period, the average number of days across all firms without shares being traded was approximately five days 
representing only 12.5 per cent of the potential trading days in the estimation period. The frequency of non-trading 
days during the estimation and event periods are accordingly considered acceptable for the purpose of this study. 
Subsequently, the approach adopted in this study is to exclude firms that have no shares traded for more than 50 per 
cent of the 200 day period (159 day estimation and 41 day event periods). This resulted in the exclusion of only four 
(marked with #) of the original 38 SENS announcements of financial restatement as identified in Table II.  
 
Table II 
The Sample, Restatements Dates And Trading Summary Of The Estimation And Event Periods 
JSE Ticker Firm SENS Date 
Shares 
Traded  
(in millions) 
Estimation Period Event Period 
Days with no 
shares traded* 
Days with no 
shares 
traded** 
ART Argent Industrial Ltd. 22-Oct-02 16.48 35 4 
TNT Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd. 22-Nov-02 52.05 0 0 
SNT Santam Ltd. 17-Mar-03 22.32 1 0 
MTO Mathomo Group Ltd.# 25-Mar-03 64.68 115 31 
PNC Pinnacle Technology Holdings Ltd.# 27-Mar-03 556.9 98 25 
CDZ Cadiz Holdings Ltd. 30-Jul-03 356.63 31 6 
WHL Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 12-Feb-04 14.19 0 0 
MSM Massmart Holdings Ltd. 26-Feb-04 114.45 0 0 
DTA Delta Emd Ltd. 01-Mar-04 52.99 13 2 
ADH Advtech Ltd. 23-Mar-04 189.82 9 0 
BDS Bridgestone Firestone Maxiprest Ltd. 31-Mar-04 210.93 33 8 
AMA Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd. 21-Apr-04 106.6 10 2 
JDG JD Group Ltd. 18-May-04 114.22 0 0 
PGR Peregrine Holdings Ltd. 20-May-04 41.38 16 4 
MPC Mr Price Group Ltd. 26-May-04 16.48 0 0 
IMR Imr Investments Ltd. 31-May-04 29.06 72 14 
ART Argent Industrial Ltd. 03-Jun-04 40.29 0 0 
SCN Scharrig Mining Ltd. 03-Jun-04 60.4 73 31 
CSH CS Computer Services Holdings Ltd. 14-Jul-04 10.27 15 7 
CSB Cashbuild Ltd. 21-Jul-04 12.8 6 2 
UTR Unitrans Ltd. 24-Aug-04 300.98 23 4 
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MUR Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd. 26-Aug-04 129.81 0 0 
PAP Pangbourne Properties Ltd. 26-Aug-04 396.25 1 0 
MET Metropolitan Holdings Ltd. 08-Sep-04 1.27 0 0 
NWL Nu-World Holdings Ltd. 26-Oct-04 12.3 28 5 
IDI Idion Technology Holdings Ltd. 14-Dec-04 51.15 76 18 
DEC Decillion Ltd.# 15-Dec-04 36.71 94 26 
ELX Elexir Technology Holdings Ltd. 14-Apr-05 290.74 75 17 
AST Ast Group Ltd. 06-Jul-05 28.78 0 0 
LAB Labat Africa Ltd. 31-Aug-05 1,140.67 57 26 
NTC Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd. 11-Nov-05 233.61 0 0 
AFR Afgri Ltd. 08-Nov-06 22.5 2 0 
YBA Yomhlaba Resources Ltd.# 27-Jun-07 96.25 159 41 
BFS Blue Financial Services Ltd. 16-Aug-07 16.64 0 0 
AER Amalgamated Electronic Corporation Ltd. 26-Nov-07 128.8 0 0 
ATR Africa Cellular Towers Ltd. 27-May-08 54.73 1 0 
BEE Beget Holdings Ltd. 04-Jun-10 43.77 56 18 
CMO Chrometco Ltd. 27-Aug-10 9.5 46 7 
*  Refers to 159 potential trading days in the estimation period.  
**  Refers to 41 potential trading days in the event period.  
#  Firm excluded from sample due to thin trading. 
 
In order to examine the market reaction in relation to the magnitude of the restatement, the rand value of 
the restatement and total equity value of restating firms’ were obtained from the SENS announcements and/or the 
annual reports of the respective firms. The annual reports were obtained directly from restating firm websites. Given 
that the sample includes restating firms varying in size, the rand value of each firm’s restatement is standardised as a 
percentage of the restating firm’s total equity prior to restatement. The last column of Table III indicates the rand 
value of the restatement expressed as a percentage of the total equity prior to the restatement. 
 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
 
The abnormal returns during the event period are calculated for each firm by differencing predicted 
(expected) values, calculated in terms of the modified market model from the actual returns. The abnormal returns 
are standardised by a conditional variance estimated using a second GARCH model with a dummy variable for the 
event period and averaged per day to produce average standardised abnormal returns (ASARs). The ASARs and the 
coefficients for the dummy variable measuring the immediate variance effect of the event at firm level are reflected 
in Table III. 
 
Table III 
Average Standardised Abnormal Return And Dummy Variable Coefficient 
JSE 
Ticker 
N ASAR Std Dev t-value Pr > |t| 
Dummy Variable 
Coefficient 
Restatement Value as Percentage 
of Equity 
ADH 41 -0.013 0.241 -0.340 0.733 
 
0.7024 
 
-4.7020% 
AER 41 -0.132 0.420 -2.010 0.051 * 0.0185 ** -7.4515% 
AFR 41 -0.025 0.407 -0.390 0.699 
 
1 
 
0.0000% 
AMA 41 -0.002 0.386 -0.030 0.974 
 
0.6265 
 
-1.9873% 
ART 41 0.054 0.260 1.330 0.190 
 
<.0001 ** -1.7007% 
ART 41 0.091 0.431 1.350 0.184 
 
0.4927 
 
-0.1595% 
AST 41 0.031 0.229 0.880 0.385 
 
0.999 
 
0.0636% 
ATR 41 -0.053 0.181 -1.870 0.069 * 0.1564 
 
0.0000% 
BDS 41 0.014 0.233 0.390 0.701 
 
1 
 
0.0000% 
BEE 41 0.008 0.044 1.100 0.277 
 
0.0444 ** 0.1198% 
BFS 41 -0.036 0.250 -0.910 0.366 
 
1 
 
-1.9726% 
CDZ 41 0.092 0.374 1.570 0.124 
 
1 
 
-1.2226% 
CMO 41 -0.002 0.089 -0.110 0.913 
 
1 
 
-16.2889% 
CSB 41 0.188 0.592 2.030 0.049 ** 0.2997 
 
-3.0759% 
CSH 41 0.016 0.103 0.990 0.327 
 
0.2178 
 
-1.2328% 
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DTA 41 -0.299 0.638 -3.000 0.005 ** 1 
 
-2.3658% 
ELX 41 -0.007 0.036 -1.200 0.239 
 
0.0005 ** -0.0967% 
IDI 41 0.010 0.208 0.300 0.770 
 
0.0768 * -0.0034% 
IMR 41 0.007 0.115 0.390 0.701 
 
<.0001 ** -16.8902% 
JDG 41 -0.102 0.738 -0.880 0.383 
 
0.2811 ** -0.0013% 
LAB 41 -0.010 0.118 -0.530 0.597 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0033% 
MET 41 0.009 0.606 0.090 0.927 
 
0.3481 
 
-8.4055% 
MPC 41 -0.121 0.786 -0.990 0.330 
 
1 
 
-2.5792% 
MSM 41 -0.027 0.626 -0.270 0.786 
 
0.3419 
 
-0.3661% 
MUR 41 -0.022 0.569 -0.250 0.807 
 
1 
 
-4.2271% 
NTC 41 0.011 0.630 0.120 0.908 
 
0.5016 
 
-0.3903% 
NWL 41 0.087 0.461 1.200 0.235 
 
0.7713 
 
-0.2400% 
PAP 41 0.095 0.643 0.950 0.350 
 
<.0001 ** 1.9288% 
PGR 41 -0.045 0.354 -0.810 0.423 
 
1 
 
-10.3905% 
SCN 41 -0.013 0.070 -1.150 0.258 
 
1 
 
-0.6769% 
SNT 41 0.096 0.668 0.920 0.365 
 
1 
 
0.0000% 
TNT 41 -0.025 0.657 -0.250 0.806 
 
1 
 
-1.3221% 
UTR 41 0.063 0.576 0.710 0.484 
 
0.0787 * -3.4247% 
WHL 41 -0.123 0.487 -1.610 0.115 
 
1 
 
-0.0493% 
*, ** Significant at the 0.1 and 0.05 level respectively  
 
Indicating significant uncertainty in restating firm share prices, the dummy variable coefficient for nine of 
the 34 firms in the sample was found to be statistically significant at the ten per cent level of significance. Of the 34 
firms that had restatements, 27 (79.4 per cent) had a decrease in equity, three (8.8 per cent) had an increase in 
equity, and four (11.7 per cent) had no effect on equity. In turn, of the 27 firms who had a decrease in equity, 16 
(55.9 per cent) had negative ASARs and 11 (44.1 per cent) returned positive ASARs, albeit that only four of the 
restating firms had statistically significant ASARs. Of the three firms that had an increase in equity, all three had 
positive ASARs and negative ASARs were found for three (75 per cent) of the four firms where the restatement did 
not impact on the equity. 
 
By analysing the trading activities in the days leading up to and subsequent to SENS announcements of 
forced financial restatement, we can gain insight into why restating firms’ share prices are negatively or positively 
affected by such announcements. Examining the volume of shares traded during the event period further enables us 
to evaluate whether or not investors react to SENS announcements conveying information about forced financial 
restatements. The number of shares traded for each of the restating firms were accumulated on a daily basis and 
presented in diagram II below.  
 
Diagram II 
Volume Of Shares Traded 
 
 
Days +1 and +5 illustrate two significant spikes in the volume of shares traded across the 34 firm sample 
following the financial restatement announcements on day 0. This increased trading activity suggests that SENS 
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announcements for forced financial restatements appear to induce a degree of uncertainty about the restating firm by 
market participants. Further to this, the effect that the forced financial restatements have on the respective restating 
firms’ equity value, the ACSARs for four periods are calculated and presented in Table IV. The four time intervals 
provided are relative to the restatement announcement and are for days 0 and day +1, day 0 until day +5, day 0 until 
day +10, and day 0 until day +20.  
 
Table IV 
Average Cumulative Standardised Abnormal Returns 
Time intervals relative to restatement announcement ACSAR Std Dev 
Day 0 till Day +1 -0.0963% 0.0868 
Day 0 till Day +5 -0.160% 0.0906 
Day 0 till Day +10 -0.142% 0.0893 
Day 0 till Day +20 -0.0358% 0.0854 
 
A negative market reaction of -0.0963 per cent is found for time interval from day 0 and day +1. This 
indicates that the market reacts negatively in the immediate period following the SENS announcements. Further to 
this, a negative ACSAR of -0.16 per cent for the period day 0 until day +5 supports the evidence of increased 
volume in share trading five days following the announcement (see diagram III). The ACSAR for the time period 0 
till +10 days is still significantly negative (-0.142 per cent) and eventually peters down to -0.0358 per cent in the 
final time period up till day +20. The negative share price reaction is consistent with the findings of Xu, Jin and Li 
(2009), Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz (2004), and Dechow et al. (1996), albeit that the extent of the reaction in 
this study is smaller. Given that the aforementioned studies were conducted in the US, the findings from this study 
may indicate that the dissemination of information by the JSE and the resultant market reaction appears to result in 
negative returns that are not as large and might be one of the positive results of a well regulated JSE given the 
number one global ranking it has according to the WEF. 
 
Table V 
Market Reaction Relative To The Magnitude Of The Financial Restatement 
 
Coefficients t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.0004 -0.02296 0.981821 
ASAR 0.192433 0.564997 0.576016 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.099384 
R Square 0.009877 
Adjusted R Square -0.02106 
Standard Error 0.086477 
Observations 34 
 
Table V presents the results of regressing the SARs on the standardised size of the restatement. This 
analysis indicates whether or not the market reaction is significantly associated with the magnitude of the 
restatement. While the negative intercept is consistent with the literature (see for example Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney 1996 and Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz 2004), the coefficient (0.192433) for the ASAR is not found to 
be statistically significant (t=0.564997). Furthermore, the independent variable (specifically the size of the 
restatement) only explains 0.9877% of the share price reaction to SENS announcements. This result suggests that 
while the market generally responds negatively to the financial restatement announcements, the size of the 
restatements do not impact the market reaction.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the share price reaction to forced financial restatements 
announced via SENS. Given that incorrect or misrepresented financial results are potentially trust-destroying and 
question the credibility of management, investigating the market reaction to restatements provides evidence as to the 
extent of such forced restatements on the share price of the firm. Needless to say, the results indicate that the SENS 
announcements decreased the equity of 79.4 per cent of the firms. Of these firms, 55.9 per cent had negative 
ASARs. Therefore, the results indicate that of the restating firms that had a decrease in equity due to the SENS 
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announcement, more than half experience significantly negative share price reaction following SENS 
announcement. Although this is what would be expected, 44.1 per cent of the share prices experienced positive 
ASARs. This would seem to suggest that the market reaction to the SENS announcement is not only a function of 
the forced restatement itself, but also the type of restatement. Further research should be conducted to verify this 
assertion. 
 
Furthermore, the volume of shares traded ex post the announcement date spiked substantially on days’ +1 
and +5. Of particular interest is that the ACSAR for the share reactions peaked in the time period up to five days 
after the announcement, fell slightly for the period up till ten days (albeit still high), and then normalised back to 
almost zero after about twenty days. Overall, the results indicate that while share prices are generally expected to 
react negatively to restatement announcements, the negative reaction is restricted to approximately 20 days 
following the announcement. This alludes to the likely uncertainty that market participants face following a forced 
financial restatement announcement via SENS. Further to this, evidence is provided (see Table V) that suggests that 
the market is more attuned to whether or not a restatement exists in the first place than the actual size of the 
restatement. The credibility of ‘first-time’ financial reporting is therefore found to be extremely important to market 
participants and may provide evidence supporting feelings of distrust and uncertainty emanating from market 
participants as suggested by Mercer (2004) and Palmrose & Scholz (2004).  
 
Whilst extracting the data from the SENS announcements, it became clear that the manner in which certain 
firms articulate the reason behind the misrepresented financial results was in many cases unnecessarily verbose. To 
the mind of the authors, this creates unnecessary confusion and detracts attention from the extent and magnitude of 
the restatement itself. Although it is accepted that a thorough explanation for the restatement by the firm is indeed 
important for dissemination by the market, it is proposed that announcements of specifically financial restatements 
through SENS be presented in a standardised format that puts the presentation of information on par for all firms 
making the announcement. This will avoid situations where the content of the restatement is unnecessary wordy in 
an attempt to downplay the seriousness of the restatement. Further to this, it is proposed that a future study should 
focus on conducting a content analysis on the actual SENS announcements to investigate to what extent firms use 
‘positive’ and/or ‘unnecessary’ words or explanations to hide a restatement that may be particularly equity-eroding.  
 
Further research should be conducted to investigate whether or not the market reacts more aggressively to a 
restatement (voluntary and forced) as such, or, alternatively, the size or nature of the restatement. Further to this, it 
could be investigated what exactly market participants regard as being a substantial restatement. In other words, 
would market participants react similar to a minor adjustment on, for example, the income statement as compared to 
a major adjustment on the balance sheet, or is the fact that a restatement on respectively the income statement or 
balance occurs in the first place, needless to say of the perceived magnitude of it, more likely to induce a significant 
abnormal return? The findings of this study suggest that the latter appears to be more important as a determinant to 
possible abnormal returns, or at the very least, the reaction to trading as depicted in the substantial increase in 
trading volume after the SENS announcement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study the share price reaction to SENS announcements of forced financial restatements is examined. 
A two-stage event study that scales abnormal returns with conditional variance estimated with a GARCH (1,1) 
component and an event indicator was used to examine the effect that the announcements had on the respective 
firms’ share prices. Although the results indicate that the majority of the market reactions resulted in negative 
changes to equity, but the size of the decrease in equity is smaller than previous studies conducted predominantly in 
the US. The study therefore makes an important contribution to the existing literature as it investigates financial 
restatement announcements on shares listed on a South African Stock exchange.  
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